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In this paper I makemore explicit a position that I have being advocating
for more than two decades (gathered together in Fuller 2002, Fuller
2010), though its full force does not seem to have been felt. I write in
defence of the commodification rather than the simple commercialisation
of knowledge. The two italicised terms are oen spoken about in the
same breath—and, to be sure, they are related to each other. But they
are not the same. Commercialisation refers to the subjection of social life
to the price mechanism, something that Adam Smith believed happened
spontaneously, if it was not impeded by churches and states. And while
Smith’s celebration of commercial culture makes him the philosophical
father of capitalism, he would probably not approve of capitalism’s
long-term tendency to turn aggregated versions of these spontaneous
exchanges into objects that are themselves subject to exchange relations,
which is commodification. Nevertheless, it is precisely in this sense
of ‘commodification’ that I defend the university as a producer of
knowledge as a public good, both in terms of teaching and research. I
place the shi from commercialisation to commodification in a larger
historical context first clearly identified by Ernst Cassirer – namely, a
shi in metaphysical consciousness that accompanied the treatment
of substances as the bearers of functions, which is associated with
the introduction of algebra as a unifying principle of mathematical
reasoning in the early modern era, initially through Descartes, which
then became the basis of the modern physical world-view.
In what follows I aim to make more explicit a position that I have being
advocating for more than two decades (gathered together in Fuller 2002, Fuller
2010), though its full force does not seem to have been felt. I write in defence of
the commodification rather than the simple commercialisation of knowledge. The
two italicised terms are oen spoken about in the same breath—and, to be sure,
they are related to each other. But they are not the same. Commercialisation
refers to the subjection of social life to the price mechanism, something that
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Adam Smith believed happened spontaneously, if it was not impeded by
churches and states. On this view, commercialisation is an emergent feature
of our natural propensity to trade, from which the division of labour arises
and complex societies form as a long-term consequence. The process involves
many specific interactions in which people decide tomake qualitatively different
things functionally equivalent in particular exchanges. A unit of currency, or
money, also emerges from this process, understood as an efficient mechanism
for enabling anyone to trade anything, anywhere and at any time. Once that
level of efficiency is established and it covers a sufficiently large proportion of
social life, we can speak of “commercialisation.”
Nevertheless, while Smith’s celebration of commercial culturemakes him the
philosophical father of capitalism, hewould probably not approve of capitalism’s
long-term tendency to turn aggregated versions of these spontaneous exchanges
into objects that are themselves subject to exchange relations, which is
commodification. Had Smith been around to witness this metamorphosis, he
would have described it as commercial culture converting money from a means
to an end in itself—indeed, very much as it was described by Marx, who in
turn drew on Kant’s distinction between “price” and “worth” as two senses of
“value.” Specifically, money came to be seen notmerely as providing an empirical
summary—or statistical indicator—of many actual exchanges (i.e. “price”) but as
something with an independent existence on which one might wish to stake
public or private investment, either through the national treasury or the stock
market (i.e. “worth”). For example, if I deem that the market does not naturally
provide enough bread for everyone who wants bread, I might wish to alter the
workings of that market. Of course, depending on whether I am a bureaucrat or
an entrepreneur, I would intervene somewhat differently. But in either case, my
motive is informed by a second-order understanding of markets that leads me to
want to manipulate if not steer them in some desirable direction. This mentality
presupposes commodification, in that “bread” now stands for the set of wants
and needs normally satisfied by the thing to which the term conventionally
refers.
Capitalism understood as a dynamic economic system that might bring
about something called “socialism,” or any other politically progressive future,
requires commodification—that is, exchange relations must apply not only to
loaves of bread (i.e. commercialisation) but also to the very possibility of bread
(i.e. commodification). I am very much of the school (to which Marx himself
eventually belonged) that believes that socialism must build on capitalism’s
proven successes as a mode of economic organization. Indeed, as Saint-Simon
first argued, the concept of the firm as an entity legally incorporated on terms
other than as an extended household (e.g. a “family business”) marked the first
step from capitalism to socialism. In this respect, socialism is the socialisation
of capitalism, insofar as concern is shied from the adequate provision of
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bread for one’s household to the adequate provision of bread for anyone who
might want or need some. In the Saint-Simonian scheme, the path of progress
from capitalism to socialism is clear and was revived in early-twentieth-century
Britain by the Fabian Society (Fuller and Lipinska 2013, chap. 3). I say this
because, despite Marx and Engels’ brilliant negative branding of Saint-Simon
as a “utopian socialist,” Marx in particular harboured nostalgic views about
communitarian forms of social life that might be somehow revisited in the
future. These tend to surface whenever Marxists envisage the prospect of
abolishing money in their “scientific socialism.”
Notwithstanding Marx’s own ambivalence, I do not share the fundamental
suspicion of the commercialisation of social life that was voiced mainly
by the churches in Adam Smith’s day but continues in secular guise from
communitarian political theorists such as Michael Sandel (2012) and “virtue
theorists” in ethics and epistemology, typically in debt to Alasdair MacIntyre
(1981), whose views of “human nature” presume that Aristotle is state-of-the-art
biology and sociology. (A curious feature of this rearguard development is that
it is oen cast as an expression of the ideological “le,” a phenomenon I address
elsewhere: Fuller and Lipinska 2013, chap. 1). In any case, all of these theorists
give undue—by which I mean, non-negotiable—weight to past practices (aka
“tradition”) in a world that presents us with significantly new prospects and
demands. In the guise of appearing “fair” and “humane,” they imagine a rather
specific bourgeois form of existence as the summum bonum—albeit one that
proposes to enable a larger number of people to share in it (e.g. via development
aid abroad and poverty relief at home). Put as an explicit policy proposal: “We
shall raise you from your morally and materially squalid condition if you agree
to the ‘decent quality of life’ that we already enjoy—and not some other set of
lifestyle improvements that you might want to purchase.”
The stock of communitarians and virtue theorists has risen in recent years
as they have rushed to fill the legitimation void le with the loss of intuitive
salience of John Rawls (1971)’s argument for the welfare state, which had traded
on a risk-averse response to uncertainty about one’s own exact status in a
hypothetical social contract. Thus, instead of appealing to “rational intuitions”
that no longer seem to inspire spontaneous universal assent, communitarians
and virtue theorists have offered a more explicit metaphysical grounding that
requires no explicit assent yet is based on the welfare state’s track record in
cultivating what people presumably need to flourish—namely, “capabilities,”
an updated version of Aristotelian potencies, entities that decidedly cannot
be reduced to “human capital” or even “social capital” (Nussbaum and Sen
1993). Nevertheless, efforts by communitarians and virtue theorists to promote
the “good life” have done lile to retard the advance of capitalism. Many
crass entrepreneurs have taken full advantage of liberalised laws governing the
accumulation and transfer of property over the past 250 years. Such individuals,
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without much prior training in “virtue” or aachment to “community,” got
wealthy simply by taking risks and playing themarket. And they have been quite
prepared to go further and treat knowledge itself as just one more commodity.
To begin to appreciate this point, consider “curricularisation” as the
pedagogical equivalent of “commercialisation.” Let us say that everyone needs
to know Plato in order to flourish as a human being. But exactly what is it about
Plato that they need to know? Do they need to read Plato’s Dialogues—perhaps
even in the original Greek?Maybe. But others will argue that adequate access to
Plato can be gained by other means, such as by commentaries, simplifications,
modernisations, etc. These people may even claim that the “essence” of Plato
could be assimilated more efficiently in these ways, thereby allowing the
space and time for other things to be included in the curriculum. They have
effectively made the shi to knowledge as a commodity. To be sure, many such
“pedagogical commodifiers” aremore interested in removing barriers to learning
than turning a profit. Nevertheless, just like the capitalists who also want people
to have efficient access to knowledge (albeit with the greatest profit potential),
they are trading on a distinction introduced by the Neo-Kantian philosopher
Ernst Cassirer (1923) in one of the shrewdest books ever wrien to explain the
emergence of the modern world-view.
The core Cassirer thesis applied to the case at hand is this: knowledge, no
less than anything else, can be understood as either a substance or a function.
In other words, knowledge may be defined in terms of what it is (substance)
or what it does (function)—if the laer, then in principle whatever substance
currently functions as knowledge could be replaced in the future by some other
substance that serves that function more efficiently. Thus, to continue with the
earlier example, to treat Plato’s Dialogues as a knowledge substance is to treat
them as sui generis, irreducible and incorrigible. In that case, commentaries and
other would-be replacement works are epistemically degraded versions of the
Dialogues, if not a completely other sort of knowledge substance. In contrast,
to treat Plato’s Dialogues as serving a variety of knowledge functions is to
imagine that they might be replaced by something else that serves the relevant
function in a given context. According to Cassirer, the prospect of converting
any substance to a function in this manner, which he saw as motivating
Galileo’s Platonic revenge on Aristotle, was made possible by the introduction of
algebra as the unifying principle of mathematical reasoning—which, in the early
modern context, consisted of arithmetic and geometry. The power of algebra
was especially felt in analytic geometry, which Descartes introduced to model
the motions of physical bodies but was already being proposed as the matrix for
economic reasoning in the early eighteenth century by George Berkeley, thereby
paving the way for commercialisation to be leveraged into commodification
(Caffentzis 2007).
If academics cannot recognise their own spontaneous tendencies towards
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knowledge commodification, that is only because we fail to clearly differentiate
the value of knowledge as something produced and as something consumed.
In particular, as soon as we say that everyone should learn something, we are
injecting an economic dimension into their knowledge consumption comparable
to a dietary requirement, which raises issues concerning appropriate calorie
allocation, given the limits to what we can and should ingest. By analogy,
then, Plato might be made more available either in his “natural” form by
cultivating more Plato specialists, or his intellectual nourishment might be
provided more readily and digested more easily by encounters with various
human and non-human functional substitutes. To be sure, any of these policies
would incur costs in terms of other forms of knowledge that would end up in
a diminished trading position in the curriculum. In this respect, an optimal
curriculum is like an optimal diet: ingest the most nutrients (content) in the
fewest calories (time). The logic of the analogy suggests that over time, reading
Plato’s Dialogues in Greek will become a “gourmet” item in the curriculum
(“made with original ingredients!”) as knowledge of Plato becomes increasingly
“functionalised” to cohere with the teaching of other canonical figures.
My main point here is that academics should be already familiar with
commercial reasoning through curricular design, which is basically an invitation
to construct an internal knowledge market which, through the university’s
credentialing function, then has extra-mural consequences. Those potential
extra-mural consequences serve to standardise the internal exchanges, so that
one becomes less interested in whether enough Plato is taught than whether
the Plato-like hole in the curriculum is adequately filled. No less than the
proverbial homo oeconomicus, academics have infinite wants about what should
be taught (namely, anything that they believe is worth researching), but finite
resources within which to resolve those wants into a coherent course of study
for the next generation. I have long wrien of the university as the original
entrepreneurial institution because of its use of the classroom to “creatively
destroy” the socio-economic advantage associated with new research aimed
primarily at academic specialists and/or big business (e.g. Fuller 2009, chap. 1).
And while this self-understanding is not widely held by academics themselves,
capitalists enter the academic arena fully aware of the tendency towards the
“functionalisation” of knowledge—and act accordingly.
Thus, the most influential private funder of natural and social science in
the twentieth century, John D. Rockefeller, was very interested in promoting
knowledge for greater social benefit, albeit in ways that would not seriously
disadvantage his investments. At the same time, he was also very wary of
universities, which insisted that any new knowledge be introduced through their
institutionally protected markets (aka peer review). Rockefeller funded bodies
that while affiliated with universities nevertheless had ways of circumventing
just such academic protectionism. His distrust, while unfortunate, is not
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without cause. Recall that when “postmodernism” was first launched into public
discourse (Lyotard 1983), its most controversial feature was the implication that,
historically speaking, universities have been largely parasitic on innovations
made outside their walls, which were then captured and converted into courses
of study that served to regiment any future innovation in those fields.
From this perspective, universities appear to be the ultimate
counter-entrepreneurial institutions that aim to routinise any innovation
that comes their way. Here it is worth recalling that Joseph Schumpeter, the
economist who defined entrepreneurship in terms of the “creative destruction”
of markets, also distinguished “invention” from “innovation”; while an invention
is simply a novelty, an innovation implies an enduring transformation in a wide
range of practices. Schumpeter had specifically in mind the ways in which
the emergence of Henry Ford’s motorcar as the dominant mode of individual
transport reconfigured every other aspect of modern life in less than a
generation (McCraw 2007). Nevertheless, this reconfiguration did not require
that everyone explicitly adopt an ideology promoted by Ford, though he was
certainly promoting one. Rather, people reorganized their lives in terms of the
motorcar, so that it became a necessary part of whatever lives they led—more
specifically, a product that had to be serviced and replaced on a regular basis.
The advent of personal computers in the 1980s had a comparable effect.
However, this sense of innovation is almost the exact opposite of the
more strictly epistemic innovations recounted in, say, Kuhn (1970), which are
still captured well by the distinction between the contexts of “discovery” and
“justification” in science. In that case, an invention (or “discovery”) becomes
an innovation by being incorporated in a common body of knowledge—call
it a “paradigm”—that allows the practitioners of the relevant science to
move forward collectively. The innovation’s place is “justified” by acquiring
a stable position in the paradigm as a “building block” for future advances
of knowledge. Whatever radical potential there might be for the innovation
to radically reconfigure the scientific enterprise has been contained—at least
temporarily. Thus, the original textbook presentations of Einstein’s theory of
special relativity described it as a modification of Newtonian mechanics—not
as the revolutionary foundations for a new physical world-view. Of course,
Einstein’s theory eventually acquired this larger significance. Nevertheless,
historians of science aer Kuhn are inclined to present these maers as
unintended consequences rather than as akin to the planned outcomes sought
by a Rockefeller or a Ford.
But why this conservative bias when innovations occur in science as opposed
to technology? Indeed, perhaps the closest that the philosophy of science has
come to recognising that targeted entrepreneurship can change the course
of science—which in Rockefeller’s case resulted in the mid-twentieth-century
revolution in molecular biology—is Popper’s falsificationism, which at least
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captured the deliberately destructive character of “creative destruction.”
However, lacking in Popper was any account of how one arrives at an alternative
hypothesis to the status quo that might open up the research field in more
creative directions, as opposed to trivial refutations that leave the field not so far
from where it began. In philosophy of science terms, this is about the proverbial
search for a “logic of discovery” (Laudan 1981), which Popper treated as a black
box. For their part, Rockefeller and Ford thought about these maers on a
grander scale—not simply whether an innovation can survive the competition
but whether it can dominate the market and thereby force competitors to play
by its rules.
The difference is that the great entrepreneurs deployed their considerable
resources to institutionalise innovations, very oen buying out potential
competitors. Practices of this sort are actively discouraged within academia,
where even out-of-pocket payments—let alone the private funding of entire
research programmes—are regarded as inherently corrupting. Admiedly,
science pursued outside of academia with an eye to profits escapes these
strictures. Indeed, the dean of American science journalists, Daniel Greenberg
(2007), aer spending most of his career uncovering the military-industrial
interests behind “pure science” in the Cold War, now urges universities to
be more aggressive in cultivating their own intellectual property in light
of the open door policy announced by the US Congress through the 1980
Bayh-Dole Act. I read this as a call for universities to becomemore self-conscious
knowledge commodifiers. While Greenberg depicts it as an effective survival
strategy in a world without escape from capitalism, I see this in more positive
terms, as universities are forced to raise their public game in an activity that
they have always conducted within their own walls—albeit only through the
curriculum—where “canon wars” have periodically erupted over entitlements to
the scarce resource of student time.
Were universities to embrace Greenberg’s strategy with gusto, they would
start to approximate the Saint-Simonian ideal of a firm in charge of the
regular production and distribution of what might be called “epistemic
functionality”—that is, knowledge that satisfies recurrent needs in a timely
way. In this context, the modern “two cultures” problem would start to appear
in a different light. When a follower of C.P. Snow claims that engineers
and economists are beer candidates for the civil service than classicists
and historians, s/he should not be understood as simply saying that we
need new knowledge for new times. More subtly, s/he is saying that the old
knowledge is not adequate for today’s version of the old standing needs,
especially those related to the exercise of foresight: Does knowledge of precedent
and consequence match the epistemic power of survey and prediction? The
humanities and the sciences would never have appeared to be at war over the
past 150 years, had their functionalities not been seen as comparable in just this
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way. Such presumed commensurability testifies to the commodification of what
might be called the “knowledge-to-rule,” the logic of which implies that those
aspects of the classics and history that genuinely contribute to a contemporary
understanding of knowledge-to- rule will be preserved in the scientific surveys
and predictions. Of course, empirically this is oen not the case. However, so
I would argue, the appropriate response is not to reject the very idea that the
humanities can be functionalised in this way, but to engage more artfully in
what is essentially a task of pouring old wine into new boles.
To conclude, it is worth re-iterating a point I have oen made: Knowledge
by default is a positional, not a public good. In other words, knowledge begins as
something I possess but you lack, yet something would be to your advantage
to possess, even if that means I would lose my advantage over you. To be sure,
knowledge can be—and should be—made into a public good. But that requires
ongoing effort, something that happens to be built into the institutional design
of universities. These organizations routinely remove the positional advantage
of new knowledge by teaching people without requiring them to reproduce the
path that the original knowledge producers travelled. Put more generally, the
transition in the status of knowledge from a positional to a public good amounts
to commodification, as pedagogy functionalises—and thereby dissipates—any
original epistemic advantage. However, knowledge as a public good is a rather
peculiar commodity, since its value is determined more by the cost incurred by
lacking it than the benefit received from possessing it. Thus, if I believe that Plato
should be known by everyone, then my efforts to make Plato a public good will
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